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SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON:  
SETTING AN UNREASONABLE STANDARD 
JESSICA STURGEON 
INTRODUCTION 
Employment discrimination is often understood to entail 
employment policies that explicitly prejudice specific groups. A less 
obvious form of discrimination that may be even more insidious, 
however, occurs when policies that seem innocent have a disparately 
large effect on specific groups of employees. Specifically, 
discrimination that is “facially neutral”—that is, not immediately 
appearing to favor one class over another—is more difficult to 
prevent or eliminate. Congress and the Supreme Court have taken 
steps to control facially neutral employment discrimination in some 
contexts,1 but the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. City of 
Jackson demonstrated that the Court does not view all forms of 
employment discrimination with equal concern. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19642 prohibits employment 
practices that are facially neutral but have a disparate impact on a 
protected group of employees.3 In Smith v. City of Jackson,4 the 
Supreme Court explicitly recognized disparate impact liability in age 
discrimination cases.5 In applying the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), however, the Court applied a 
substantially weaker standard than it has applied under Title VII. 
Under Title VII, employers could prevail despite engaging in a 
 
Copyright © 2007 by Jessica Sturgeon. 
 1. See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) 
(“It shall be an unlawful employment practice . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or to otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. 
 4. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 5. Id. at 232. 
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practice that had a disparate impact on a protected group if that 
practice passed the business necessity test. Under the ADEA, an 
employer, according to the Court, does not need to show that a 
discriminatory practice is a business necessity, but only that it is based 
on a “reasonable factor other than age.”6 The decision appeared to 
help employees by recognizing disparate impact claims, but did so by 
embracing a standard that made pursuing such claims extremely 
difficult. 
This Note argues that although the Court was correct to hold 
that disparate impact claims were cognizable under the ADEA, the 
limitations that the Court imposed rendered such claims practically 
unwinnable. Part I explores the origins of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act. Part II discusses the development of disparate 
impact liability under Title VII and under the ADEA prior to Smith. 
Part III discusses the Court’s decision in Smith. Finally, Part IV 
addresses the impact of the Smith decision and argues that the 
decision effectively foreclosed any disparate impact theory of liability 
under the ADEA. 
I.  ORIGINS OF THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 
During congressional debates regarding the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, Congress requested a report from the secretary of labor on 
“factors which might result in discrimination in employment because 
of age and of the consequences of such discrimination on the 
economy and individuals affected.”7 The secretary of labor,  
W. Willard Wirtz, complied with Congress’s request and issued what 
is commonly known as the Wirtz Report. Congress passed the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 19678 in response to the Wirtz 
Report’s findings.9 The Wirtz Report addressed four types of 
employment discrimination against older employees: (1) dislike or 
intolerant feelings unrelated to ability to do work; (2) setting of age 
limits beyond which employers will not consider older workers for 
 
 6. Id. at 242. 
 7. Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz 
Report Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 758 (1997) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE 
OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE 
SECRETARY OF LABOR TO CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
(1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]). 
 8. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000). 
 9. Harper, supra note 7, at 757, 762. 
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positions; (3) consideration of facially neutral factors such as health, 
adaptability to new technology, and aptitude testing; and (4) 
“‘institutional arrangements’ which are ‘designed to protect the 
employment of older workers while they remain in the work force.’”10 
Although the Report found that the first category of discrimination 
was not prevalent, it concluded that the other three categories of 
discrimination seemed to have greater prominence in the workplace.11 
Scholars have dubbed the Report’s second form of age 
discrimination, the arbitrary setting of age limits, as “statistical 
discrimination.”12 Although statistical discrimination may be 
economically sound to individual employers, the Report indicated 
that this type of differentiation between older and younger employees 
may be damaging to the aggregate economy.13 Employers assumed 
that older employees were less productive and increased labor costs. 
As a result, older employees were considered less desirable and 
subject to widespread age discrimination.14 The resulting “forced 
retirement, unemployment, and underemployment of many 
potentially productive older Americans, as well as the aggravation of 
the burden of public support for the elderly,” indicated that age 
discrimination in the employment context was problematic for the 
economy as a whole.15 
The Wirtz Report’s third category addressed employment 
practices based on factors other than age. Despite being facially 
neutral, such practices sometimes had a disproportionate effect on 
older workers.16 Factors in employment decisions such as “health, 
educational attainment, adaptation to new technology, and aptitude 
testing” were found to disproportionately affect older workers.17 This 
type of discrimination, according to the Report, is particularly 
troubling because of the difficulty involved in discovering it.18 
 
 10. Id. at 758–61 (quoting WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 7, at 2, 15–17). 
 11. Id. 
 12. For discussion regarding statistical age discrimination, see, for example, Edmund S. 
Phelps, The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659, 659 (1972), and 
George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment Discrimination 
Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 500 (1995). 
 13. Harper, supra note 7, at 760. 
 14. Id. at 759–60. 
 15. Id. at 760. 
 16. Id. at 761. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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The final category addressed in the Wirtz Report concerned 
programs that aimed, in theory, to protect older members of the 
workforce but, in practice, sometimes provided an even greater 
motivation for employers to discriminate against older workers.19 For 
example, programs such as health insurance plans can increase costs 
to the employer as their employees age, thus providing an economic 
reason for employers consciously to reduce the average age of their 
employees.20 Thus, although these programs might appear to benefit 
older workers, they may actually contribute to age discrimination by 
employers. 
The Wirtz Report did not recommend that Congress prohibit all 
practices in the third and fourth categories. Rather, it considered 
factors in the third category to be demonstrative of “a relationship” 
between age and job performance.21 But, even though the Report 
indicated some correlation between job performance and age, it also 
suggested that the scope of an age discrimination law would need to 
go beyond prohibiting overt discrimination to alleviate the impact 
that age discrimination could have on the aggregate economy.22 
Under the ADEA, the facially neutral factors from the Wirtz 
Report’s third category are the focus of debate over the disparate 
impact theory of liability. Until Smith v. City of Jackson, neither 
Congress nor the Supreme Court had addressed the availability of 
disparate impact claims under the ADEA.23 Nevertheless, in light of 
evolving Title VII jurisprudence, numerous courts had already 
recognized similar claims under the ADEA, a development explored 
more thoroughly in the next part of this Note. 
 
 19. Id. at 761–62. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 762 (quoting WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 7, at 2). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 230 (2005). The words “disparate impact” do not 
appear in the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000). In addition, prior to Smith, the Supreme 
Court had not opined on the issue. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) 
(“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the 
ADEA.”). 
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II.  DEVELOPMENT OF DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY  
PRIOR TO SMITH 
A. Title VII Disparate Impact Theory 
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,24 the Supreme Court officially 
recognized a disparate impact theory of liability under Title VII for 
the first time.25 Prior to the enactment of Title VII, Duke Power’s 
workforce was segregated, with black employees working in only one 
of the five operating departments.26 With the enactment of Title VII, 
Duke Power altered its policy to require that applicants have 
completed a high school education and have passed two aptitude tests 
to qualify for employment in any of the four operating departments 
previously limited to whites.27 The Court in Griggs found that 
“[n]either [of the tests] was directed or intended to measure the 
ability to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs.”28 The 
Court of Appeals had upheld the validity of the tests, finding that 
Duke Power had not had a discriminatory purpose in requiring the 
tests.29 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision, holding that Title VII prohibited not only employment 
actions that are motivated by prejudice against protected groups but 
also employment actions that have an adverse impact on protected 
groups.30 
The Court limited the availability of the disparate impact theory 
of liability, however, by introducing the business necessity test.31 Not 
all adverse impacts, the Court held, were actionable—only those that 
“b[ore] [no] demonstrable relationship to successful performance of 
the job[]” were prohibited.32 The Griggs Court found that Congress’s 
intent to prohibit employment actions that resulted in a disparate 
 
 24. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 25. Id. at 432. 
 26. Id. at 426–27. 
 27. Id. at 427. 
 28. Id. at 428. 
 29. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (4th Cir. 1970), rev’d, 401 U.S. 424 
(1971) (“Although . . . we concluded . . . that the educational and testing requirements adopted 
by the company continued the effects of . . . prior discrimination, . . . it seems reasonably clear 
that this requirement did have a genuine business purpose.”). 
 30. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32 (“The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”). 
 31. Id. at 431. 
 32. Id. 
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impact, in addition to those that constituted disparate treatment, was 
apparent from the text of Title VII.33 Because the tests required by 
Duke Power had a disparate impact on black applicants and did not 
“bear a demonstrable relationship” to job performance, Title VII 
prohibited such tests.34 
In 1989, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of 
disparate impact theory under Title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio.35 A group of nonwhite salmon cannery employees brought 
suit under Title VII claiming that several of the employer’s hiring and 
promotion procedures, including nepotism, subjective hiring criteria, 
and a rehire preference, were racially discriminatory.36 As in Griggs, 
the Court recognized the general validity of disparate impact claims 
under Title VII.37 
The Court, however, also significantly changed the standard 
under which it would consider disparate impact claims.38 Instead of 
applying the business necessity test announced in Griggs, the Court 
announced the business justification test.39 Under the business 
justification test, employers were not required to show “that the 
challenged practice [was] ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the 
employer’s business for it to pass muster.”40 Rather, the Court 
announced that “[t]he ultimate burden of [persuasion] 
remain[ed] . . . at all times” with the disparate impact plaintiff.41 The 
defendant only had the burden of production—the employer only had 
to assert a particular business justification that could justify the 
disparate impact.42 Specifically, plaintiffs were still required to prove 
that they suffered an adverse employment action “because of” the 
protected classification.43 Yet, for disparate impact plaintiffs to 
successfully meet this new burden of persuasion, they also had to 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
 36. Id. at 648–49. 
 37. Id. at 645–46 (“Under . . . the ‘disparate-impact’ theory, . . . a facially neutral 
employment practice may be deemed violative of Title VII without evidence of the employer’s 
subjective intent to discriminate.”). 
 38. Id. at 658–61. 
 39. Id. at 658. 
 40. Id. at 659. 
 41. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988)). 
 42. Id. at 660. 
 43. Id. 
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prove that “other tests or selection devices, without a similarly 
undesirable [discriminatory] effect, would also serve the employer’s 
legitimate [hiring] interest[s].”44 Unless the plaintiff could show that 
the employer could have served their legitimate hiring interest in a 
way that would not have a disparate impact on older workers, the 
plaintiff could not prevail.45 The Court held that the employees in 
Wards Cove had failed to meet the more stringent requirements of 
the business justification test and reversed the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision.46 
Displeased with the decision in Wards Cove, Congress acted 
quickly to amend Title VII to match more closely the interpretation 
of disparate impact claims from Griggs.47 First, Congress reenacted 
the business necessity test, legislatively overturning the more 
employer-friendly business justification test.48 Second, Congress 
restored the burdens set forth in Griggs, requiring that the employer 
prove any business necessity defense it raised.49 Finally, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 abolished the requirement, set forth in Wards 
Cove, that a disparate impact plaintiff identify the specific 
employment practice that caused the disparate impact.50 Instead, a 
plaintiff could prevail on a disparate impact claim under Title VII by 
showing that the decisionmaking process as a whole resulted in a 
disparate impact on employees in a protected class.51 
 
 44. Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 661. 
 47. Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument Against 
Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 625, 
631 (1996). 
 48. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2000) (“An unlawful 
employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this subchapter only if a 
complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that 
causes a disparate impact on the basis of [an unlawful classification] and the respondent fails to 
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question and 
consistent with business necessity.”). 
 49. For the language of the statute, see § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 50. See id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (“[T]he complaining party shall demonstrate that each 
particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, except that if the 
complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a respondent’s 
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process 
may be analyzed as one employment practice.”). For the business necessity test, see Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); for the business justification test, see Wards Cove 
Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 659. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
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B. ADEA Disparate Impact Theory 
Following the Court’s decision in Griggs, many courts 
interpreted that decision to apply to the ADEA, in addition to Title 
VII, and, accordingly, recognized disparate impact claims under the 
ADEA.52 Among the first to do so was the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit in Geller v. Markham.53 In the Geller decision, the 
Second Circuit cited Supreme Court precedent as justification for 
applying the disparate impact theory of liability recognized under 
Title VII to the ADEA.54 Not all courts, however, were so eager to 
apply Title VII’s disparate impact liability under the ADEA.55 
Furthermore, not all Supreme Court Justices were amenable to such 
claims. Ten years after Griggs, in his dissent to the denial of certiorari 
in Geller, Justice Rehnquist opined that the ADEA, unlike Title VII, 
did not support disparate impact claims and noted that the Supreme 
Court had never actually addressed the issue.56 
The standard used by courts that recognized disparate impact 
claims under the ADEA continued to evolve as the standard for 
evaluating such claims under Title VII changed. Indeed, despite the 
fact that Griggs and Wards Cove both construed Title VII, rather than 
the ADEA,57 some courts continued to rely on these cases when 
evaluating disparate impact claims.58 Following the Griggs decision, 
all courts to consider the issue recognized the availability of a 
 
 52. See, e.g., EEOC v. Borden’s Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394–95 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that a 
disparate impact claim exists under the ADEA); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 
F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983) (describing the elements of a prima facie case for disparate impact 
age discrimination); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying the 
principles of Griggs to hold employer liable when a fifty-five-year-old teacher was denied 
employment, in favor of a younger teacher, to avoid a higher pay grade). 
 53. 635 F.2d at 1027. 
 54. Id. at 1030 (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)). 
 55. See, e.g., Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e find 
that disparate impact claims may not be brought under the ADEA . . . .”); Massarsky v. General 
Motors, Corp., 706 F.2d 111, 120 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Although the Second Circuit has expressly 
recognized the disparate impact doctrine in the ADEA context, this court has never ruled on 
whether a plaintiff can establish a violation of the Act by showing disparate impact alone.” 
(citation omitted)); see also Herbert & Shelton, supra note 47, at 630 (citing cases which did not 
find disparate impact liability under the ADEA). 
 56. Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 947 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from the denial 
of cert.), denying cert. to 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 57. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645 (1989); Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425 (1971). 
 58. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 47, at 631–34. 
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disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA.59 Such a view 
was justified by the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA.60 
Following the Wards Cove decision, many courts continued to 
recognize a disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA, but 
applied the more employer-friendly business justification test to those 
claims.61 The amendments to the Civil Rights Act which restored the 
more employee-friendly business necessity test from Griggs had little 
effect on disparate impact claims under the ADEA because courts 
declined to address the issue.62 
In 1993, the Supreme Court addressed the developing ADEA 
disparate impact case law and asserted in Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins63 that it had never decided whether disparate impact claims 
were available under the ADEA.64 In Hazen, an employee brought 
suit alleging that his employer fired him to keep his pension from 
vesting, thereby violating the ADEA.65 The Court held that “there is 
no disparate treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating 
the employer is some feature other than the employee’s age.”66 
 
 59. E.g., Monroe v. United Airlines, Inc., 736 F.2d 394, 407 (7th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. 
Borden’s, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984); Allison v. W. Union Tel. Co., 680 F.2d 1318, 
1323 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 60. See, e.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980) (“Although the ADEA 
did not adopt Title VII’s procedural rules entirely, the rule permitting a case to be established 
by a showing of discriminatory impact or treatment cannot reasonably be viewed as merely 
procedural.”). 
 61. See, e.g., Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 953–54 (8th Cir. 2001) (“A 
plaintiff in a disparate impact case must first establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by 
identifying a specific employment practice and then presenting statistical evidence of a kind and 
degree sufficient to show that the practice in question caused the plaintiff to suffer adverse 
employment action because of his or her membership in a protected group.”); Lowe v. 
Commack Union Free Sch. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364, 1370 (2d Cir. 1989) (“‘[T]he plaintiff must offer 
statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has 
caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions because of their membership in a 
protected group.’” (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988))). 
 62. See, e.g., Fisher v. Transco Services-Milwaukee, Inc., 979 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.4 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“[R]eversal is required in this appeal regardless of . . . whether the [Civil Rights Act of 
1991] affects the ADEA at all.”); Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 39 n.5 (D. Me. 
1993) (“[I]t is unnecessary to reach the issue of the effect of the 1991 amendments to Title VII 
on ADEA claims.”); Libront v. Columbus McKinnon Corp., No. 83-CV-858S, 1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19029, at *8 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 23, 1992) (“This Court need not presently decide 
whether the [Civil Rights Act of 1991] changes the burdens of proof in ADEA actions.”). 
 63. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 64. Id. at 610 (“[W]e have never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is 
available under the ADEA.”). 
 65. Id. at 606–07. 
 66. Id. at 609. 
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Because the employee alleged that his employer dismissed him to 
prevent his pension benefits from vesting, not on account of his age, 
the Court remanded the case for a jury to consider whether age was a 
motivating factor in the employee’s termination.67 
Following the decision in Hazen, a circuit split developed, with 
some courts not allowing disparate impact claims under the ADEA,68 
some allowing such claims,69 and still others remaining undecided.70 
Although the Fifth Circuit had not addressed the issue until Smith v. 
City of Jackson,71 its decision led the Supreme Court to definitively 
assert the existence of a disparate impact claim under the ADEA.72 
III.  SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON 
A. Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court Decisions 
In October 1998, the city of Jackson, Mississippi enacted a plan 
to increase the salaries of all city employees.73 One of the purposes of 
the pay raise plan was to make the salaries of city workers 
competitive with other public employers in the Southeast.74 By 
 
 67. Id. at 610–12. 
 68. See, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700–01 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 811 (1999) (declining to recognize a disparate impact theory of liability under the ADEA); 
Maier v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir. 1997) (“We have held that [a disparate 
impact] theory of liability is not cognizable under the ADEA.”); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 
F.3d 999, 1004 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1245 (1996) (holding that a plaintiff must 
prove that age was actually the motivating factor behind the adverse employment action). 
 69. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1999) (evaluating disparate 
impact claims based on age together with a disparate impact claim based on gender because 
“[t]his Court generally assesses claims brought under the ADEA identically to those brought 
pursuant to Title VII, including disparate impact claims”); Arnett v. Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. 
Sys., 179 F.3d 690, 697 (9th Cir. 1999) (following its own precedent expressly reaffirming 
disparate impact theory despite Hazen opinion); Dist. Council 37, AFSCME v. New York City 
Dep’t of Parks and Recreation, 113 F.3d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1997) (same); Smith v. City of Des 
Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). 
 70. See, e.g., Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631, 639 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“We assume without 
deciding that disparate impact analysis applies to age discrimination claims.”); Lyon v. Ohio 
Educ. Ass’n and Prof’l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139 n.5 (6th Cir. 1995) (“There is considerable 
doubt as to whether a claim of age discrimination may exist under a disparate-impact theory.”); 
DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[I]n the wake of 
Hazen, it is doubtful that traditional disparate impact theory is a viable theory of liability under 
the ADEA.”). 
 71. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 184 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 72. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 231 (2005). 
 73. Id. at 231. 
 74. Id. 
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enacting the plan, the city hoped to “attract and retain qualified 
people, provide incentive for performance, maintain competitiveness 
with other public sector agencies and ensure equitable compensation 
to all employees regardless of age, sex, race and/or disability.”75 
In May 1999, the city revised the plan.76 Under the revised plan, 
the city granted police officers who had been with the department for 
less than five years proportionally higher raises than those who had 
been city police officers for five years or more.77 Although 66.2 
percent of officers under forty received more than a 10 percent 
increase in pay, only 45.3 percent of officers over forty received such 
raises.78 
Due to the discrepancies between the raises which older officers 
and younger officers received, a group of Jackson police officers aged 
forty and above filed a suit under the ADEA, claiming both disparate 
treatment and disparate impact.79 Petitioners claimed that the city’s 
plan disproportionately benefited younger workers.80 The district 
court found that petitioners had failed to show an unlawful 
discriminatory motive on the city’s part and dismissed the disparate 
treatment claim.81 The district court also dismissed the disparate 
impact claim, holding that the ADEA did not support disparate 
impact claims.82 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated the disparate 
treatment claim, remanding for further discovery on that issue, but 
affirmed the district court’s holding regarding the disparate impact 
claim.83 The United States Supreme Court granted the petition for 
certiorari on the disparate impact issue.84 In Smith v. City of Jackson, 
the Supreme Court concluded that the ADEA did support a disparate 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 242. 
 79. Smith v. City of Jackson, Civ. A. No. 3:01-CV-367BN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27284, at 
*3–4 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 6, 2002), vacated, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other grounds, 544 
U.S. 228 (2005). 
 80. Smith, 544 U.S. at 231. 
 81. Smith, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27284, at *13. 
 82. Id. at *17. 
 83. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 184–85, 198 (5th Cir. 2003), aff’d on other 
grounds, 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
 84. Smith v. City of Jackson, 541 U.S. 958 (2004). 
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impact claim, but affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the officer’s 
disparate impact claim.85 
In announcing the opinion of the Court, Justice Stevens’s 
plurality opinion began by addressing the nexus between the ADEA 
and Title VII.86 Justice Stevens explained that the ADEA makes it 
unlawful for an employer 
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age; [or] to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as 
an employee, because of such individual’s age.87 
Comparing relevant text, the use of “age” in the ADEA, rather than 
“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,”88 as in Title VII, is the 
only difference between § 623(a) of the ADEA and § 2000e-2(a) of 
Title VII.89 Furthermore, both statutes contain an exception allowing 
“otherwise prohibited” employment practices if the guiding factor is a 
“bona fide occupational qualification” (hereinafter BFOQ).90 The 
ADEA, however, has a more limited scope than Title VII.91 In 
particular, the ADEA not only contains an exception for BFOQs, but 
also allows differential treatment based on “reasonable factors other 
than age” (hereinafter RFOA).92 
Justice Stevens reasoned that when two statutes contain similar 
language, serve similar ends, and are enacted in close proximity to 
one another, Congress must have meant for the two statutes to have 
 
 85. Smith, 544 U.S. at 231–32. 
 86. Id. at 232. 
 87. Id. at 232–33 (citing Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.  
§ 623(a) (2000)). 
 88. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 89. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 90. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). A BFOQ is a characteristic which is 
essentially required for an employee to do his or her job. For example, hiring a male actor to 
portray a male role is not prohibited sex discrimination. In contrast, a pilot does not necessarily 
need to be under a particular age. However, a pilot does need to be able to see. An employment 
policy requiring that qualification would likely have a disparate impact on older workers, given 
that such a requirement would be based on a “reasonable factor other than age,” and therefore 
not prohibited by the ADEA. 
 91. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(f), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). 
 92. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
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the same general meaning.93 Following from that premise, Justice 
Stevens relied on Griggs, Hazen, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and Department of Labor’s interpretations of 
Title VII and the ADEA, and the inclusion of the RFOA provision in 
the ADEA to find that a disparate impact theory of liability is 
available under the ADEA.94 For instance, the Griggs Court found 
that “Congress had ‘directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences 
of employment practices, not simply the motivation,’” and held that a 
plaintiff was not required to show discriminatory intent in order to 
recover under Title VII.95 Justice Stevens argued that Congress 
likewise intended that the ADEA address the effects of employment 
practices.96 
Beyond finding analogical support for a disparate impact cause 
of action under the ADEA, Justice Stevens also found independent 
indications that the ADEA allowed for liability under a disparate 
impact theory.97 He noted that the Department of Labor, which 
originally drafted the ADEA, and the EEOC, which was the agency 
responsible for implementing the ADEA, had both recognized the 
availability of a disparate impact theory under the ADEA.98 
Finally, Justice Stevens reasoned that the inclusion of an RFOA 
provision in the ADEA did not make sense unless a disparate impact 
theory of liability was cognizable under the Act.99 If the ADEA was 
meant to allow only disparate treatment claims, Justice Stevens 
reasoned, the RFOA provision would have no effect because only 
employment policies which explicitly addressed age would be 
covered.100 Under § 623(a), employers are prohibited from 
discriminating against employees on the basis of the employees’ 
age.101 The inclusion of a reasonable factor other than age exception is 
logical only if disparate impact claims are recognized under the 
ADEA.102 Based on the Court’s holding in Griggs, the EEOC and 
 
 93. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). 
 94. Id. at 233–40. 
 95. Id. at 234 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)). 
 96. Id. at 235. 
 97. Id. at 236–38. 
 98. Id. at 239–40. 
 99. Id. at 238–39. 
 100. See id. at 239 (“Rather than support an argument that disparate impact is unavailable 
under the ADEA, the RFOA provision actually supports the contrary conclusion.”). 
 101. Id. at 233. 
 102. Id. at 238–39. 
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Department of Labor’s interpretations of both Title VII and the 
ADEA, and the inclusion of the RFOA provision, Justice Stevens 
reasoned that recovery was available for disparate impact claims 
under the ADEA.103 
Although Justice Stevens held that recovery based on a disparate 
impact is allowable under the ADEA, he also held that disparate 
impact liability thereunder was much more limited than disparate 
impact liability under Title VII.104 The addition of the “reasonable 
factor other than age” provision in the ADEA and the amendment to 
Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 led the Court to find that 
Congress intended the availability of disparate impact claims under 
the ADEA to be significantly more narrow.105 
The Court highlighted the difference between the ADEA and 
Title VII by reference to the Civil Rights Act of 1991.106 Following the 
Court’s decision in Wards Cove, Congress amended Title VII to 
expand the scope of disparate impact liability under Title VII to its 
pre-Wards Cove level.107 Congress, however, did not make these 
amendments to the ADEA.108 The Court reasoned that, without the 
amendment to scale back the Wards Cove decision, the holding in 
Wards Cove governs disparate impact liability under the ADEA.109 
Additionally, the Court focused on the inclusion of the RFOA 
provision in the ADEA and its absence from Title VII.110 The 
inclusion of the RFOA provision highlights the difference between 
the relevance of age as a factor in employment and the relevance of 
race, sex, religion, or other Title VII-protected classifications in 
employment practices.111 Because, Justice Stevens reasoned, some 
entirely legitimate and necessary employment requirements will have 
a greater negative impact on older workers than on younger workers, 
the RFOA provision was necessary to account for the real impact that 
age can have on an employee.112 
 
 103. Id. at 239–40. 
 104. Id. at 240. 
 105. Id. at 240–41. 
 106. Id. at 240. 
 107. Id.; see supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 108. Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
 109. See id. (“Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical language 
remains applicable to the ADEA.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 240–41. 
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In applying this rule, Justice Stevens found that the actual pay 
plan in Jackson, Mississippi did not violate the ADEA.113 The city’s 
plan based raises solely on position and seniority.114 Though officers 
with less seniority did receive proportionately higher raises than those 
with more seniority, the city explained the difference based on their 
“perceived need to raise the salaries of junior officers to make them 
competitive with comparable positions in the market.”115 Justice 
Stevens found this justification reasonable, though he conceded that 
there may have been other reasonable ways to achieve the city’s goal, 
making it clear that the Court was not using the business necessity 
test.116 Instead, Justice Stevens was using a more employer-friendly 
reasonableness standard to determine the validity of disparate impact 
claims under the ADEA.117 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Sandra Day O’Connor both 
concurred, separately, in the judgment. Justice Scalia concurred in the 
judgment and joined all of Stevens’s opinion except the portion using 
Griggs, textual similarities between the ADEA and Title VII, and the 
existence of the RFOA provision in the ADEA as independent 
justifications for finding disparate impact liability under the ADEA.118 
Justice Scalia did agree that a disparate impact theory of liability was 
available under the ADEA, but believed that recognizing such claims 
was appropriate because the EEOC’s construction of the statute 
deserved judicial deference.119 The ADEA granted authority to the 
EEOC to set forth “‘such rules and regulations as it may consider 
necessary or appropriate for carrying out’ the ADEA.”120 Pursuant to 
the ADEA, the EEOC issued a regulation proclaiming that 
employment practices that had an adverse impact on individuals over 
the age of forty, but were based on a reasonable factor other than 
age, were acceptable under the ADEA only if they were justified as a 
 
 113. Id. at 241–42. 
 114. Id. at 242. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 243. 
 117. Id. The reasonableness standard the Court used in Smith has since been applied as the 
“business justification test.” See, e.g., Meachum v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461 F.3d 134, 141 
(2d Cir. 2006) (“The best reading of the text of the ADEA—in light of City of Jackson and 
Wards Cove—is that the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the factfinder that the 
employer’s justification is unreasonable.”). 
 118. Smith, 544 U.S. at 242–45 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 243 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2000)). 
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business necessity.121 Justice Scalia argued that “[e]ven under . . . 
unduly constrained standards of agency deference,” the EEOC’s 
interpretation of the ADEA to include a disparate impact claim 
warranted deference from the Court.122 Therefore, in Justice Scalia’s 
view, the EEOC’s regulations indicating that there was a disparate 
impact claim under the ADEA ought to be controlling.123 
Although Justice O’Connor also concurred in the judgment in 
Smith, she, along with Justices Kennedy and Thomas, would have 
affirmed the Court of Appeals’s dismissal of the officers’ claim 
because the ADEA does not allow for recovery based on a disparate 
impact theory of liability.124 Justice O’Connor used the “ADEA’s text, 
legislative history, and purposes” to conclude that “Congress did not 
intend the [ADEA] to authorize [disparate impact] claims.”125  
Both § 623(a)(1) and § 623(a)(2), the two provisions in the ADEA 
that define conduct prohibited under the statute, forbid employment 
actions that have an adverse effect on an individual “because of such 
individual’s age.”126 Justice O’Connor interpreted the inclusion of this 
language as Congress’s intent to make employers liable for adverse 
actions against individuals only when those actions were “motivated 
by the individual’s age.”127 In Justice O’Connor’s view, paragraph 
(a)(2) did not mean that the ADEA supported a disparate impact 
claim but rather that any facially neutral policy had to be intended to 
have an adverse effect as a result of the employee’s age to violate the 
ADEA.128 
Additionally, Justice O’Connor interpreted the inclusion of the 
RFOA provision as Congress’s intent to “‘insure[] that employers 
[are] permitted to use neutral criteria’ other than age even if this 
 
 121. Id. at 243–44. 
 122. Id. at 244–45 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001)). According to 
the Court, “Chevron recognized that Congress . . . engages in express delegation of specific 
interpretive authority . . . .” Mead, 533 U.S. at 229 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)). “We have recognized a very good indicator of 
delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express congressional authorizations to engage in the 
process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference 
is claimed.” Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)). 
 123. Smith, 544 U.S. at 244–47 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 124. Id. at 248 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 248–49. 
 127. Id. at 249. 
 128. Id. 
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results in a disparate adverse impact on older workers.”129 The RFOA 
provision should be viewed, according to Justice O’Connor, as an 
indication that Congress intended to protect against age 
discrimination only where there was intentional discrimination.130 
Justice O’Connor also highlighted the legislative history of the 
ADEA as justification for her argument that the ADEA did not 
support a disparate impact theory of liability.131 Because the Wirtz 
Report was the model for the ADEA, and that report indicated that 
intentionally disparate treatment of individuals based on age was the 
true concern, Justice O’Connor understood the ADEA to prohibit 
intentional age discrimination (or disparate treatment) but not to 
forbid employment practices that only have a disparate impact on 
older employees.132 
B. Analysis of the Various Opinions in Smith 
The Court’s decision in Smith that a disparate impact theory of 
liability existed under the ADEA is well-supported. The inclusion of 
the RFOA provision, the similarities between the ADEA and Title 
VII, and the EEOC and Department of Labor’s interpretations of the 
ADEA all indicate that Congress intended that a disparate impact 
theory of liability be available under the ADEA. 
First, the inclusion of the RFOA provision in the ADEA, despite 
its exclusion from Title VII, supports a reading of the ADEA to allow 
for disparate impact claims.133 As Justice Stevens pointed out in the 
plurality portion of his opinion, the RFOA provision would not be 
essential to the ADEA if Congress had not contemplated a disparate 
impact claim under the statute.134 The structure of the statute supports 
Stevens’s reasoning.135 
 
 129. Id. at 251 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 232–33 (1983)). 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 253–56. 
 132. Id. at 254–56. 
 133. Id. at 238–40 (majority opinion). 
 134. Id. at 238–39. 
 135. A disparate treatment claim requires both a classification on the basis of age and 
discriminatory intent, but disparate impact claims challenge facially neutral actions. See Brett 
Ira Johnson, Note, Six of One, Half-Dozen of Another: Mullin v. Raytheon Co. as a 
Representative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously Distinguishing the ADEA from Title VII 
Regarding Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 303, 305–06 (2000) (describing the 
elements of disparate treatment and disparate impact claims). Even when an action is otherwise 
prohibited, employers are not liable for actions based on a reasonable factor other than age 
(facially neutral actions). Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
